Rent Control is Not a Subsidy

Keywords: rent, housing, property
Abstract Type: Paper Abstract

Abstract

Cities across the United States have recently considered and adopted rent control policies in
the face of escalating housing costs. Despite a dearth of empirical evidence for the supposedly
devastating effects of contemporary rent controls on urban housing markets, and calls among
economists dating back to the 1990s for a re-evaluation of the consensus, antagonistic interests
have persisted in raising the familiar tropes. We argue that these objections stem from
neoclassical economics’ theoretical misappropriation of rent control as a form of subsidy to
tenants, which is rooted in a doctrinate commitment to support for the property rights of
rentier interests under the guise of efficiency and welfare maximization. We address the most
prominent objections to the policy in the literature and illustrate how looking at the problem
relationally and belies the objections raised.